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Introduction 
As India enjoys the title of a rising global power, it seeks to ensure political stability and 
economic development, both nationally and within its region. Over the past decade, India has 
made concerted efforts in employing a soft power approach towards its neighbours, 
determined by its geostrategic position and political and security concerns. As a result, 
India’s soft power capacity has accentuated and formed a crucial aspect in its diplomatic 
engagements. 
The idea of ‘soft power’, as defined by Joseph Nye, rests on the ability of a country to 
represent its foreign policy motives attractively enough for its counterparts to accept them 
and thus eliminates the use of coercion.
1
 In the international environment, following the post-
Cold War era, military confrontations and the practice of hard power became extremely 
precarious. With globalization leading to complex networks of interaction, and the rising 
presence of democratic regimes, and influential role of non-state actors, the practice of public 
diplomacy, as the most evident form of soft power, was rendered with great significance in 
the conduct of international relations.  
India has directed its foreign policy by making a “coherent effort…to raise India’s image and 
brand value in foreign countries.”2 Harsh Pant, adding to this, remarks that “under Prime 
Minister Modi, India is taking a strategic approach towards using its soft-power resources to 
enhance the nation’s image abroad.”3 This thesis will analyse India’s diplomatic relations 
with its western neighbours- namely- Pakistan and Afghanistan. While earlier events serve as 
a framework to understanding diplomatic relations, the primary focus will be to position 
India’s diplomatic conduct in light of two recent events. First, the election of Indian Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi in 2014, following which substantial attention has been driven to 
India’s neighbours and regional stability. Second, the 2016 Uri attack in Kashmir in 
September which significantly changed the power dynamics and policy approaches of India, 
Pakistan and Afghanistan. At the outset, it thus becomes important to establish an 
understanding of India’s strategic interest. 
                                                          
1
 Joseph S Nye, “ Soft Power,” Foreign Policy 80, (1990): 153-171, URL:  http://www.jstor.org/stable/1148580  
2
 Stephanie M.-L. Heng,  “Diplomacy and Image-Building: India Rides on its Soft Power”  ORF Issue Brief 163 
(2016): 3, URL: http://www.orfonline.org/research/diplomacy-and-image-building/  
3Harsh V Pant, “India’s Soft –Power Strategy,” Outlook, August 31 2015, 
http://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/indias-soft-power-strategy/295206  
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Firstly, India seeks to ensure its national security, and increasing instances of terrorism pose a 
major threat to this. This has also been the major factor in determining India’s foreign policy 
towards Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan’s strong fundamentalist values make it a safe 
haven for insurgent groups to cultivate anti-Indian sentiments, particularly aimed at wielding 
influence and territorial claim in Kashmir. Strong Islamic ideals have also led Islamabad to 
share solidarity with the Sunni, pro-Pashtun terrorist group the Taliban in Afghanistan. The 
terrorist attacks in Uri, Kashmir heightened India’s security concerns. Marking a departure 
from the previous practice of ‘strategic restraint’, the Modi led government projected its 
military assertiveness by carrying out surgical strikes. A stronger retaliation was, however, 
aimed at Pakistan’s human security, by diplomats playing the card of hydro-diplomacy, 
against Pakistan’s domestic security interest. 
Secondly, India seeks to boost its economic growth and capacity building through greater 
regional cooperation. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has 
experienced low levels of regional integration due to political differences. By inviting the 
national heads of SAARC member countries to his swearing in ceremony, PM Modi 
indicated his ambition to foster regional development through economic cooperation and 
political stability. Afghanistan’s geostrategic position makes it the connecting link between 
South Asia and the oil and mineral rich West and Central Asia. Having this realization, India 
had strongly advocated for Afghanistan’s membership in SAARC in 2007. In this context, 
while it can be argued that the realist ideals of economic and security concerns determine 
India’s strategic interest towards its western neighbours, its diplomatic approach in achieving 
these goals reflects on its belief in the principles of peaceful co-existence and regional 
solidarity.  
The first section of this thesis focuses on understanding the academic literature concerning 
soft power and diplomatic conduct as means of advancing foreign policies. In this context, 
this thesis employs the methodology of case selection focussing on qualitative analysis on 
two grounds. Firstly, unlike hard power or the military capacity of a country, which can be 
measured in quantitative terms, soft power wields outcomes over a period of time and cannot 
be quantified in absolute figures. Secondly, qualitative case selection, in the field of 
international research pertains to the study of foreign policies and decision making process 
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having links at the micro-historical level.
4
  The second section highlights this factor wherein 
India’s diplomatic engagements with Pakistan and Afghanistan, focus on specific themes of 
water diplomacy and cultural diplomacy respectively. Case selection also enabled this thesis 
to constructively build upon causal processes in understanding India’s diplomatic conduct. 
While India’s diplomatic conduct with Pakistan primarily involves national security concerns 
(dispute over Kashmir), hydro-diplomacy has sought to link this matter with domestic 
security. Likewise, Indo-Afghan relations are aimed at achieving regional peace and stability, 
to which terrorism poses a major, but not the only apprehension. Furthermore, this research 
methodology, due to its broad ambit, facilitates the understanding of the link between 
national interest and policy formulation by probing into various socio-cultural, political and 
economic factors. A second methodology employed more subtly, in the study of India’s soft 
power is content analysis, highlighting speeches and remarks made by political leaders. 
Content analysis draws on the link between cultural and historical values upheld by a country 
and public sentiments attached to it as expressed by country heads and diplomatic 
personalities. Furthermore, such statements intensify the magnitude of diplomatic 
negotiations, as political remarks aptly informs of national interests and strategic concerns.
5
  
Drawing upon the aforementioned methodologies, the majority of sources to support this 
study comprise of official and unofficial documents both. While this thesis does not directly 
cite the two main official documents, namely the Indus Water Treaty Agreement between 
India and Pakistan and the Strategic Partnership Agreement between India and Afghanistan, 
they contribute to the fundamental understanding of India’s diplomatic conduct towards its 
neighbours. Since unofficial documents such as newspapers, owing to their nation specific 
character may tend to reflect a political bias, this thesis not only studies the perspective of all 
the parties involved but also take into account external expert opinion by studying diplomatic 
and foreign policy journals. A strong dependence on unofficial documents can also be 
understood by considering the temporal context in which this thesis is placed. While a 
considerable body of academic work has been generated since the election of Indian PM 
Modi in 2014, the September 2016 Uri attacks form a much recent phenomenon. The lack of 
academic literature reflecting on aspects of international relations, in this scenario also served 
as a major gap in conducting the research. This thesis is also a humble attempt of 
                                                          
4
 Audie Klotz, “Case Selection,” in Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide, ed. Audie 
Klots et al. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 
5
 Margaret G Hermann, “Content Analysis, ” in Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist 
Guide, ed. Audie Klots et al. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 
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contextualizing India’s diplomatic relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan within the 
framework of IR and diplomatic theory. Thus combining Indian strategic interest and IR 
academia forms the crux of the analysis, wherein the research question advanced is ‘To what 
extent has India’s soft power approach, enabled it to achieve its strategic interests in regards 
to its western neighbours?’ 
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Literature Review: Soft Power and India’s Foreign Policy 
The literature for this thesis is divided into two sections. Firstly, it will talk of India’s 
relations with Pakistan in the context of the Indus Water Treaty signed between the two 
nations. The framework for this case will be hydro-diplomacy and how it is used as means of 
asserting foreign policy. The second section will focus on India’s diplomatic relations with 
Afghanistan, specifically highlighting the theory of public and cultural diplomacy and its 
application in achieving India’s strategic interest.  In this context, this thesis applies the 
theory of soft power and its sub-fields as subsequently discussed in the literature review.  
First propounded by the US political scientist Joseph S Nye, soft power can be understood as 
‘getting others to want the outcomes that you want through co-optation and not coercion’.6 
Elaborating further, Nye argues that a country’s soft power rests on three grounds: culture (in 
places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them and 
abroad) and its foreign policy (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral 
authority)’.7 A fourth feature that may be attributed to the increasing attractiveness of soft 
power is the growing focus on non-traditional forms of security, terrorism and nuclear 
capacity of states making the possibility of a full-scale military confrontation with the 
potential threat of mass destruction real. India, being the only country to share borders with 
all South Asian nations (except Afghanistan) as well as with China, realizes the threat of 
military confrontation from its past experience. Therefore, over the past decades, India’s 
foreign policy has hinged on the country’s cultural and political values, liberal institutions 
and welfare oriented policies as assets of its soft power.  This thesis follows Kugiel’s 
argument that India’s soft power is aimed at fostering regional cooperation and solidarity 
achieved through a holistic approach encompassing a ‘benign foreign policy, promotion of 
economic interdependence, strong cultural cooperation and foreign assistance.’8 The conduct 
of soft power, as it aims at projecting a country’s attractiveness, is intricately linked to the 
practice of public diplomacy.  
                                                          
6
 Joseph S Nye, “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,” ( New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5 
7
 Joseph S Nye, “Think Again: Soft Power” Foreign Policy, (February 23, 2006), URL: 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2006/02/23/think-again-soft-power/  
8
 Patryk Kugiel, “India’s Soft Power in South Asia,” International Studies 49 (3&4) (2012); 363 doi: 
10.1177/0020881714534033  
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Public diplomacy can be understood as government initiatives to advance foreign policy, and 
to promote national interest by appealing to the public sentiments of the target country as 
well as the host country.
9
 With increasing global interdependence and integration, public 
diplomacy has come to play a significant role in projecting a nation’s foreign policy. While 
the traditional definition of public diplomacy involves diplomatic interaction limited to 
government ministries, the ‘new public diplomacy’ involves reciprocal exchange of ideas and 
negotiations, involving state as well as various non state actors.
10
 The practice of new public 
diplomacy is therefore employed by state and non-state actors to ‘understand cultures, 
attitudes and behaviour; build and manage relationships and influence thoughts and mobilize 
actions to advance their interests and values.”11 The broad ambit of new public diplomacy 
incorporates various forms of diplomatic exchange and wields more promising outcomes of a 
nation’ s soft power, by creating greater public appeal amongst target audience.  
India’s public diplomacy since the mid-1990s has largely been determined by the “Gujral 
doctrine,” advocated by the former Indian PM I.K Gujral in 1997. Delineating India’s 
conduct of foreign relations with its immediate neighbours, the doctrine strongly advocated 
for adhering to “sovereign equality, non-interference and non-reciprocal magnanimity.12  
However, the undertone that the doctrine adopted, can indeed be argued to have reciprocal 
sentiments wherein, India’s foreign relations, as guided by the Gujral doctrine, can only 
become successful if its South Asian neighbours extend and follow the same principles, 
especially those of non-interference and respect to state sovereignty. India, under its new 
leadership, has altered and expanded on the Gujral doctrine to achieve its political interest. 
Furthermore, the doctrine also mentions that ‘no South Asian country should allow its 
territory to be used against the interest of another country of the region.’13 This particularly 
holds relevance in the trilateral relations between India, Afghanistan and Pakistan as Pakistan 
has advanced its political interest and support to terrorism in Kabul as well as in Kashmir. In 
this regards, India’s security and strategic interest remain at the apex of its diplomatic 
conduct. Considering its national interests, India’s diplomatic relations with Pakistan, as the 
case studies will demonstrate, hinge on traditional public diplomacy and new public 
                                                          
9
 Kennon H. Nakamura, and Matthew C Weed, “U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and Current Issues,” 
Congressional Research Service, (2009). URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40989.pdf  
10
 Jan Melissen, “Public Diplomacy,” in Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices, ed. Pauline 
Kerr et.al. (: Oxford University Press, 2013) 
11
 Ibid,193 
12
 Kanak M Dixit, “Gujral Doctrine for Modi Darbar” The Hindu, last modified June 15, 2015, URL: 
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/gujral-doctrine-for-modi-darbar/article7888715.ece   
13
 Padmaja Murthy, “The Gujral  Doctrine and Beyond,” Strategic Analysis 23 (4), (2008): 639-652 
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diplomacy in case of Afghanistan. In the latter scenario diplomatic efforts have encompassed 
all major aspects of soft power, i.e. projecting national culture, political value and an 
attractive foreign policy. Keeping this in consideration, the term ‘soft power’ will be used 
interchangeably with public diplomacy in assessing Indo-Afghan relations.  
Conceptualizing Hydro-Diplomacy  
The increasing instance of water scarcity has become a global phenomenon. International 
experiences such as Turkey reducing the flow of water in Euphrates and Israel cutting off 
water supply to Palestine hold testimony to the fact that nations have time and again used 
water as a weapon to advance their strategic interests and political demands, thus giving 
emphasis to the idea of “water wars”.14 The sharing of water, concerns not just the socio-
economic development of societies and regions, but also gains a non-traditional security 
aspect, with the potential of subverting the domestic and international status quo. As issues 
pertaining to water sharing shape the foreign policy attitudes of nations, unstable power 
dynamics can weaken the practice of hydro-diplomacy. However, diplomats by harbouring 
on public diplomacy resources by incorporating technical experts, ecologists and engineers in 
the practice of hydro-diplomacy, legitimize national interests in accordance to ideals of 
sustainable development.
15
 Effective diplomatic engagement is driven by the idea that while 
non-cooperation and conflicts are a costly expenditure, diplomatic ties lead to peaceful 
outcomes with minimum investments.
16
 River sharing treaties and establishment of river 
basin organizations (RBOs) serve as peaceful and legal cooperative mechanism, to curtail 
political differences. While diplomatic engagement over the sharing of water may not lead to 
absolute solidarity between countries, they do serve as a promising means of “achieving 
positive spill-overs in terms of regional cooperation”.17 
The World Bank sponsoring of the Indus Water Treaty, signed by India and Pakistan in 1960, 
has been cited as one of the prime cases of water diplomacy wherein both the signatories had 
kept aside their differences and realized the need to cooperate over water sharing for the 
security of their people. Like most agrarian economies, India and Pakistan are heavily reliant 
                                                          
14
 Joyce R. Starr, “Water Wars,” Foreign Policy 82 (Spring, 1991), doi: 10.2307/1148639  
15
 Aneel Salman, “Blue Diplomacy: Transboundary Water Governance form a Foreign Policy Lens,” Regional 
Green Dialogs, (2015) URL: https://af.boell.org/2016/01/08/blue-diplomacy-transboundary-water-governance-
foreign-policy-lens  
16
 Benjamin Pohl, The Rise of hydro-diplomacy: Strengthening foreign policy for transboundary waters (Berlin: 
Adelphi,2014), 28-32,  doi: 10.113140/2.1.4035.5848. 
17
 Pohl,  The Rise of hydro-diplomacy: Strengthening foreign policy for transboundary waters, 9 
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on water for irrigational purposes as well as expanding their industrial base. Furthermore, 
patterns of climate change and a burgeoning population has intensified the pressure on the 
available water resources. Concerns regarding water scarcity, domestic security and 
diplomatic engagements become intricately linked with the potential of escalating the 
smallest water sharing issues between countries, intractable and complicated political 
hostilities.
18
 Failure to abide by diplomatic and legal water sharing mechanisms, then, has 
negative bearing on the domestic socio-economic stability, effecting the downstream riparian 
in particular. On the contrary, the practice of water diplomacy with public diplomacy can lead 
to more promising outcomes. By using the public diplomacy apparatus, nations invest in 
advocacy programmess, involve NGOs in negotiating process to address public grievances 
and raise global awareness about water related problems.
19
 In the context of the Indus Treaty, 
diplomatic engagements have majorly involved government actors and technical experts, but 
non-state actors have also contributed to the conflict resolution process. The “Water is life” 
campaign, is a key component of the non-governmental collaborative, “Aman ki Asha” 
(desire for peace) aimed at spreading public awareness and discuss cooperative mechanisms 
involving civil society. However, due to its limited scope, this thesis will probe into the India-
Pakistan relations within the framework of water diplomacy conducted at the state level, 
drawing on the practice of traditional public diplomacy.  
Cultural Diplomacy: The Pillar of Soft Power 
Nations practice cultural diplomacy as an important aspect of public diplomacy, with the aim 
of pursuing peaceful relations, mutual respect to state sovereignty and establishing long-term 
relations.
20
 Cultural diplomacy encompasses not just political culture, involving government 
led initiatives to project national values and educational exchange, but also popular culture 
through cinema, performing arts etc. involving non-state actors. However, while cultural 
diplomacy forms an integral part of public diplomacy, where the latter is an umbrella term, 
the two cannot be equated at the same level. In contrast to public diplomacy, where the 
emphasis is on changing intellectual attitude of the counterpart, cultural diplomacy advances 
the idea of accepting different cultures which may alter the perception of individual 
                                                          
18
 Salman, “Blue Diplomacy,” 8 
19
 Naomi Leight, “Policy Brief: Water & Public Diplomacy,” Water Diplomacy Initiative (2012), URL: 
http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/useruploads/u22281/Water_Diplomacy_Policy
_Brief_Online.pdf  
20
 Geoffrey Wiseman, “Polylateralism and New Modes of global Dialogue” in Diplomacy ed. Christer Jonsson 
et al. (London: Sage Publications, 1999) 36-57 
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identity.
21
 In this sense, a nation’s cultural diplomacy can successfully attract and affiliate the 
target masses with its national culture, and achieving soft power goals. Diplomatic conduct 
then, incorporates cultural policies in the broader remit of foreign policies wherein cultural 
relations and exchange are pursued by nations.
22
  
The Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) has served as the prime institution of 
facilitating India’s cultural diplomacy since 1950 through bilateral agreements and treaties 
thus ensuring legitimacy of cultural exchange and cooperation. India and Afghanistan enjoy 
strong cultural and historical links furthered through Agreement on Cultural Relations signed 
in 1963 and more importantly through the Strategic Partnership Agreement signed in 2011. 
While governments enforce cultural policies, cultural exchange can be facilitated by non-state 
actors, in tandem to the national aspirations. As Kabul proposes to expand its relations with 
India by opening new consulate in Hyderabad, Shaida Mohammad Abdali, Afghanistan’s 
Ambassador to India highlighted Afghan aspirations to build “ties in education, commerce 
and people to people ties, cultural cooperation and cooperation in health sector.”23 The 
involvement of non-state actors has largely contributed to the idea of nation branding, as an 
important benchmark of assessing a nation’s diplomacy skills. Popular culture through 
Bollywood has gained remarkable popularity amongst native Afghans contributing to 
building a positive perception towards India. In this sense, Joshua Kurlantzick argues that 
soft power is a modification of any form of power outside of the military and security realm, 
practiced through public diplomacy as well as other forms of cooperation involving both state 
and non-state actors.
24
 
The aforementioned literature conceptualizes diplomatic conduct in a broad sense, and also 
briefly highlights India’s diplomatic engagement with two of its neighbours- Pakistan and 
Afghanistan- as crucial for India’s economic and strategic interest. However, as India has 
adopted a soft power approach to achieve these interests in a highly volatile region, owing to 
the national interest, and comparative political instability of India’s neighbours, two factors 
                                                          
21
  Paramjit S. Sahai, “India’s Cultural Diplomacy in a Globalized World,” The Diplomat (November 3, 2013) 
URL: http://www.diplomatmagazine.nl/2013/11/03/indias-cultural-diplomacy-globalised-world/  
22
 Erik Pajtinka, “Cultural Diplomacy in Theory and Practice of Contemporary International Relations.” 
Politicke Vedy 17(4), (2014), 95-108, URL: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269763112_Cultural_Diplomacy_in_Theory_and_Practice_of_Conte
mporary_International_Relations  
23
 “Afghanistan to soon open consulate in Hyderabad,” The Economic Times, (October 14, 2016). URL: 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/afghanistan-to-soon-open-consulate-in-
hyderabad/articleshow/54849846.cms  
24
 Kugiel, “India’s Soft Power in South Asia” 353 
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gain attention. Firstly, the soft power exerted by a nation, namely its ideals of democracy and 
political capital, can achieve absolute success only when it gains unanimous appeal amongst 
the masses. Afghanistan’s multi-ethnic community has bifurcated opinion about India, 
wherein the Tajiks, and a majority of progressive Pashtun community appreciate India’s 
cooperation, the Taliban controlled Pashtun region is opposed to Indian efforts.
25
 Secondly, a 
foreign policy which is essentially too “soft” in its capacity may be rendered incapable of 
asserting a nation’s strategic interest. India’s efforts to build diplomatic pressure on Pakistan 
can fall week considering the latter’s hospitable relations with China. Being a major global 
power, China’s relations with India are more competitive and contentious than cordial due to 
various bilateral disputes. The Pakistan-China alliance can adversely threaten India’s national 
security from both sides.  
This thesis is an attempt to highlight the merits of India’s soft power and diplomatic 
engagement in achieving its national interests. However, considering India’s geostrategic 
position of India, the case study also argues that while resorting to military force is a highly 
unfavourable option, military unpreparedness can render soft power efforts week as well.  In 
this regard, this study demonstrates that the idea of “soft power” and “hard power” in 
ensuring national interests become intricately linked and rests on a delicate balance between 
the two concepts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 William Dalrymple, “Forget Nato v the Taliban. The real Afghan fight is India v Pakistan,” The Guardian, 
(June 26, 2013). URL: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/26/nato-taliban-india-
pakistan  
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Isolation or Assimilation: India’s Diplomatic Relations with Pakistan 
Introduction 
Acute water crisis in South Asia, a region with extremely high population density and rising 
economic activity on one hand and conditions of abject poverty and sporadic socio-economic 
development on the other, calls for immediate and effective cooperation and resource 
development. While in theory, water management across South Asia is a top-down and 
highly bureaucratised phenomenon,
26
 in practice it has been redundant and considerably 
ineffective in implementing the complex water sharing agreements. Hydrological discourse 
forms a major component of India’s diplomatic relations with almost all of its South Asian 
neighbours, and serves as an important case study in the literature of water diplomacy. This 
chapter will study the case of Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan and how 
diplomatic conduct between the two nations is linked to issues of national security and 
regional strategic interests.  
The Indus Water Treaty- Context and Problems 
David Lilienthal, the first to advocate for a cooperative mechanism between the two countries 
wrote “No army, with bombs and shellfire, could devastate a land so thoroughly as Pakistan 
could be devastated by the simple expedient of India’s permanently shutting off the source of 
water that keeps the fields and people of Pakistan alive.”27 
Pakistan, since its formation in 1947 has been largely dependent on the Indus river basin for 
supporting over a quarter of Pakistani population and 90% of the country’s agricultural 
practices. With the increasing instances of global warming, glacier melting and high intensity 
precipitation, Pakistan’s susceptibility to the instances of flooding, followed by the drastic 
                                                          
26
 Gareth Price, “Rethinking Water-Climate Cooperation in South Asia,”  ORF issue Brief 130, (2016), URL: 
http://www.orfonline.org/research/rethinking-water-climate-cooperation-in-south-asia/  
27
 Brahma Chellaney, “Mitigating Intercountry Water Disputes and Discord,” in Water: Asia’s New 
Battleground (Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2011) , 291. 
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decrease of water supply has increased immensely.
28
 The Indus Delta, therefore is bearing the 
brunt of “severe degradation,” sparking “coastal poverty, hopelessness and despair,” further 
aggravated by the prevalent “social construct” leading to inequitable patterns of water 
allocation.
29
  While Pakistan is currently experiencing a water crisis, India is believed to 
become water stressed by 2025, or even earlier.
30
 In such a scenario, water scarcity inherently 
becomes one of the major threats to human security with the potential of creating civil unrest 
and political instability within domestic borders. The trans-border nature of Indus River links 
domestic concern to a country’s foreign relations with the fellow riparian, thereby politicising 
the issue.  
Since the first diplomatic negotiations in 1948, both India and Pakistan realized that water, 
used as a weapon, had the ability to wreak havoc. The signing of the Indus Water Treaty in 
1960, after intense diplomatic confrontations and the prevalent “political tensions between 
the states concerned,”31 sought to curtail interstate water sharing disputes from escalating into 
an armed conflict. The understanding that water was pivotal for maintaining peace and 
regional stability served as the driving force to maintain a positive bilateral relationship. This 
idea also led to the establishment of governing institutions to primarily overlook dispute 
solving mechanisms and adherence to the clauses of the treaty. The Indus Commission, 
chaired by two Commissioners from India and Pakistan each, has served as an umbrella 
institution in facilitating un-biased and peaceful diplomatic relations and technical 
cooperation. The Indus Basin Development Fund, with significant international assistance 
was aimed at supporting irrigation infrastructure, particularly in Pakistan.  
Water Diplomacy: A Framework for Dialogues and Debates 
The Indus Water Treaty has served as a hallmark of water diplomacy as it has survived three 
military confrontations between the two nations. It is important to understand water 
diplomacy as a concept within the larger framework of foreign policy. Also referred to as 
hydro-diplomacy, the practice of water diplomacy involves measures aimed at preventing or 
peacefully resolving (emerging) conflicts related to water availability, the allocation or use 
                                                          
28
 Michael Kugelman, introduction to “Running on empty: Pakistan’s Water Crisis,” (Washinton D.C: 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2009) 
29
 Ibid, 6 
30
 Robert G Wirsing, “River Diplomacy in Himalayan Asia,” in Non-traditional Security Challenges in Asia ed. 
Uttam K.Sinha et.al (New Delhi: Routledge, 2015), 154-174.  
31
 Ruben van Genderen and Jan Rood,  “Water Diplomacy: a Niche for the Netherlands,” (Netherlands Institute 
of International Relations, 2011) 
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between and within states and public and private stakeholder interests.
32
Water diplomacy can 
be practiced through various platforms and involves technical expertise as a crucial aspect of 
negotiations.
33
 The Treaty incorporates both these aspects as understood by two factors.  
Firstly, it is primarily a bilateral treaty between India and Pakistan as they are the main 
stakeholders. The nature of the Indus river basin having six rivers enabled equal division on 
both sides with India enjoying control of Beas, Ravi and Sutlej and Pakistan gaining 80 
percent of the entire share through the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum. Furthermore, the division 
of Indus waters has allowed both the nations to maintain absolute territorial sovereignty, 
thereby giving validity to the Harmon Doctrine. Conceptualized by Judson Harmon in 1895, 
the Harmon Doctrine rests on the fact that international law and its practice gives absolute 
state sovereignty the first and foremost priority in its conduct. 
From a diplomatic perspective, however, the upstream riparian state can exercise its rights in 
complete oblivion to the demands of the downstream riparian, in this case India and Pakistan 
respectively.  In the initial phase of the Treaty, while India claimed absolute sovereignty and 
greater control over the Indus waters, downstream Pakistan emphasized on absolute river 
integrity and historical rights over water, for ‘not causing “significant harm” to fellow 
riparian.
34
 The ambiguity of the doctrine, however, leaves room for misinterpretation of the 
Treaty as well as the position of the riparian states, further stressing diplomatic 
confrontations.  
Secondly, while critical issues concerning navigational and security interests to maintain 
peaceful cooperation were to be dealt with at the political level, the more complicated issues 
concerning the development of the Indus basin were dealt with by technical experts such as 
irrigation engineers or senior administrative civil servants.
35
 This attribute of diplomatic 
engagements ensures that they are conducted in a holistic manner, wherein the technicalities 
of water sharing are not overshadowed by national political concerns, and  the negotiating 
and mediating skills possessed by diplomats helps to  achieve  a mutual compromise and 
equity.  
                                                          
32
 Patrick Huntjens, “Water Diplomacy: An Approach to Prevent and Resolve Conflict,” The Hague Institute for 
Global Justice, (September 2, 2016) URL: http://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/latest-
insights/latest-insights/commentary/water-diplomacy-an-approach-to-prevent-and-resolve-conflict/  
33
 Genderen, “Water Diplomacy,” 11. 
34
 Ibid, 11. 
35
 Salman M.A. Salman and Kishor Uprety, “India-Pakistan Relations” in Conflict and Cooperation on South 
Asia’s International Rivers,(Washington D.C: World Bank Group, 2002), 57  
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The practice of hydro diplomacy is hinged on the idea that conflicts over water are irrational 
in terms of strategic and economic interests and ineffective in achieving hydrological 
development.
36
 The technical intricacies of water sharing and the political saliency of both 
the nations have led to a complex conflict resolution mechanism. However, political 
undertones and security concerns have driven India and Pakistan to prioritize their strategic 
interests in determining the water sharing framework. As both the countries have taken up 
various hydro-power projects, the Indus Treaty allows India, being the upper riparian to 
develop hydropower projects “on the headwaters of Pakistani rivers”.37 Islamabad’s 
apprehensions in this context can best be understood through two of the most important cases 
discussed below.  A second major factor in this regard is that, since the Indus flows through 
Kashmir, water sharing and territorial dispute have become intricately linked matters of 
diplomatic negotiations. 
The first major dispute arose in 1999, when military forces of India and Pakistan were 
engaged in fighting the Kargil War and diplomats and engineers were debating the Baglihar 
Dam project on the Chenab River. The plan to construct gated spillways by Indian engineers, 
aimed at preventing siltation and generating hydropower was opposed by Pakistan on two 
security related factors. Firstly, India could manipulate the water flow of Chenab, leading to 
floods as well as drought and secondly, as spelled out by the Harmon Doctrine, India sought 
to cause “significant harm” to its downstream riparian. Amidst the tensions of war, the Indus 
Commission was convened. The Indian technical expertise, addressing Pakistan’s 
apprehensions, argued that in case of flooding, India would be equally as affected as 
Pakistan, due to the positioning of the gateway.
38
 Secondly, as per the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses (UNC), “significant harm” implied serious 
consequences upon the industrial and agricultural base of the other state or on its human 
security. India had the capacity to release the withheld water, without disturbing Pakistan’s 
share over the Chenab. After considerable diplomatic negotiations, both the parties agreed to 
India’s proposal thereby showing the success of the Indus Treaty and the Indus Commission. 
The second and the most contentious issue concerns the Kishenganga dam project on the 
upper tributary of Jhelum River. Due to the natural course of the upper tributary had to be 
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diverted before it joins the Jhelum and eventually flows into Pakistan. Such a diversion, 
regulated by the Indian side, creates serious human security concerns for Pakistan. John 
Briscoe noted that “New Delhi’s ability to hold a month’s worth river flow during Pakistan’s 
critical dry season, [is] enough to wreck the entire planting season.”39 The designers of the 
Indus Treaty were well aware of the complex pattern of flow of the Jhelum River and when 
Pakistan approached the International Court of Arbitration over the dispute, it was ruled in 
India’s favour. The dispute was a prolonged one but did not threaten the functioning of the 
Indus Water Treaty or the operations of the Indus Commission. The reason behind this, as 
Briscoe noted, was because “the Indians weren’t building anything.”40  
The Indus Water Treaty, in this regard, is perhaps the second most contentious issue after the 
territorial claim of Kashmir by both the nations. The downside of this, however, is that amidst 
the political bargaining, the state of Jammu and Kashmir suffers from attaining socio-
economic development. Kashmir has huge potential to develop hydropower but the state 
experiences frequent electricity shortages. In the initial phases of the Treaty, India had not 
advanced any major hydrological projects. Considering that since the eastern rivers allotted to 
India do not flow through Kashmir, Islamabad can consider this as interference in its share of 
Western rivers, namely Chenab and Jhelum. In such a scenario, New Delhi fears that Pakistan 
can instigate civil unrest and militant insurgencies against India, detrimental to its political 
and security concerns. Pakistan, on the other hand, has feared that India’s economic capacity 
to spearhead development in Kashmir will help “win the hearts and minds”41 of Kashmiris 
and reduce its limited political support furthermore. Extremist groups in Pakistan have, time 
and again, issued open warnings against India over the water issue and raised violent slogans 
such as “Let water flow or face war,”42 thereby linking Indus Water to national security. In 
the aftermath of the Uri attacks, India has shown determination to pressure Pakistan by not 
just proceeding with its hydropower projects but also by reclaiming the 80% rights it has over 
the Indus river.  
Water Diplomacy and Soft Power 
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‘Blood and water cannot flow at the same time,’ remarked the Indian Prime Minister, 
Narendra Modi, as New Delhi advanced its water weapon towards Pakistan. The aim was not 
to disrupt the regular flow of the Indus or curtail Pakistan from receiving its share of water, 
but simply to claim India’s rights over the eastern rivers which have not been utilized to the 
maximum capacity. However, Pakistan responded to this advancement harshly with the 
Pakistani diplomat Sartaj Aziz saying any action by India would be considered an “act of 
war”.43 The acute water crisis in Pakistan, will only be heightened if a war breaks out 
between the two nations, seriously threatening the human security of Pakistan and to some 
extent of India as well. India’s diplomatic pressure on Pakistan, comes from the consideration 
that” raising dams will prove less dangerous strategy than raising guns”44 but more effective 
as Pakistan’s fragile economy, in terms of weak human capital, as well as political instability 
combined with the presence of extreme fundamentalist groups would not be able to respond 
to New Delhi’s water warfare.  
The division of the Indus river basin into equal shares, with each country having the full 
authority over three rivers each, has, regarding India-Pakistan relations, allowed  both the 
states to maintain certain levels of non-interference. However, the theory of water diplomacy 
expects the riparian nations to alter their power relation based on a? zero-sum approach and 
to work towards strengthening  diplomatic cooperation. While the Indus Treaty, in theory and 
in principle, takes into consideration factors such as agriculture, water scarcity and energy 
pertaining to human security,, in practice it fails to link it with state security. The threat to 
repeal the Indus Treaty, has however turned the tables and India has targeted the domestic 
security of Pakistan in furthering its strategic goals. Indian PM Narendra Modi had also 
remarked that Pakistan’s fight against poverty and efforts to ensure food security would fall 
far behind India, if the Treaty is repealed. A politically and economically unstable Pakistan 
will be compelled to ensure its internal stability and political legitimacy amongst its citizens, 
and can also be condemned in the international environment for its failure to ensure human 
security and support terrorism. The Uri attacks have also come to light in the international 
arena, favouring India’s standpoint. However, India can face international pressure and, as 
argued, even “global condemnation and the moral high ground which India enjoys vis-à-vis 
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Pakistan in Uri would be lost,”45 if the Treaty is repealed. Furthermore, China being an ally 
of Pakistan and the upstream riparian in sharing the Brahmaputra River, with India and 
Bangladesh, could retaliate to Indian actions by diverting the course of Brahmaputra to meet 
its hydrological interest. This would create significant hydrological and navigational 
problems for India. In all senses, the abrogation of the treaty is not just logistically 
complicated but also has adverse effects for India’s image as a ‘rising power’. In this regard, 
neither India nor Pakistan could afford such a situation which could lead to disastrous results 
in terms of human security as well as traditional security.  
Conclusion 
The above discussion entails India and Pakistan’s diplomatic relations over the sharing of the 
Indus River. India has used diplomatic tools to pressure Pakistan for ensuring its human and 
food security, largely sustained by the Indus waters. In this context, India has shaped 
Pakistan’s position as weak and fragile in addressing human rights issues, thus subjected to 
international condemnation. The success of India’s soft power is demonstrated by it resorting 
to diplomatic means rather than the use of force to advance security concerns and also 
asserted comparative socio-economic stability.  
However, as water diplomacy forms an important aspect of India’s foreign relations, not just 
with Pakistan but with other South Asian neighbours as well, Indian efforts to revive 
cooperation over eliminating them can wield better outcomes in tandem to the ideals of 
India’s soft power. By reviving the Indus Commission, suspended after the Uri attacks, India 
can strive for a strengthened cooperative mechanism, which will enhance its international 
reputation as a benevolent neighbour, catering to the needs of the aggrieved Pakistani 
populace by side-lining the political differences.  
In the regional context, India has furthered its strategic interest by developing hydropower 
projects in Afghanistan - the Salma Dam being the benchmark of cooperation. The Kabul 
river contributes 20% of the flow of the Indus in Pakistan, and in  the absence of any water 
sharing treaty between Pakistan and Afghanistan,
46India’s support to the latter to develop 
hydrological resources can also create pressure on Pakistan but without any collateral 
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damage.
47
 India’s practice of water diplomacy reflects a gesture of goodwill and its belief in 
greater cooperation as a means of strengthening regional solidarity. The underlying argument 
is that if conflicts can result in water wars, effective practice of water diplomacy can enables 
states to “win friends around the globe”48, thereby justifying the fundamental idea of soft 
power.  
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Winning Hearts, Winning Strategies: India’s Soft Power in Afghanistan 
Introduction 
A few months before India threatened to repeal the Indus Water Treaty with Pakistan, 
country heads of both India and Afghanistan inaugurated the Salma Dam in the Herat 
province of Afghanistan. Hailed by policy makers and diplomats as the benchmark of 
cooperation, the Salma dam would transform the draught stricken region into an industrial 
hub. In his inaugural speech, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi remarked “Your 
[Afghanistan’s] friendship is our honour; your dreams are our duty.”49  
The fall of the Taliban in 2001 and the withdrawal of US-NATO forces from Afghanistan in 
2014 compelled Afghanistan to ensure its geopolitical security and seek international 
assistance in achieving socio-economic development. India’s soft power policy mainly 
focussed on humanitarian aid and economic development over military assistance, as 
prioritized by Afghan government has ranked India as the fifth largest aid provider to 
Afghanistan.
50
 Such an approach is reflective of India’s strategic interest in Afghanistan, 
driven by two major aspirations. First, Afghanistan’s rich mineral base and strategic 
positioning, making it a connecting link between India and the Central Asian countries, 
drives India’s economic aspirations. Second, the threat posed by the Taliban-Pakistan alliance 
to the national security of India and Afghanistan as well as to the regional stability of South 
Asia determines New Delhi’s political considerations. In this regard, India’s foreign policy 
aims at wielding cultural and political influence and also the promotion of liberal and 
progressive ideas through education, media and politics.
51
 This would also allow India to 
build relations with various ethnic communities of Afghanistan, particularly the Pashtun 
community which serves as buffer between India and Pakistan in terms of influence. 
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Therefore, a policy hinged on socio-economic and cultural connectivity has enabled Indian 
diplomats to project India’s political salience as more effective than military engagement,52 in 
establishing a democratic, multi-ethnic and plural society supporting Indo-Afghan relations. 
Beyond Bollywood:  India’s Soft Power Policy in Afghanistan 
President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani on his recent visit to India remarked that Afghanistan is 
marred with terrorism and acknowledged India’s cooperative efforts in reviving the 
aspirations of the Afghan society. Paying tribute to Rabindranath Tagore and his classic 
novel, the Afghan President added, “Kabuliwala has done more to give us a brand which we 
could not buy with a billion dollars of investment,”53 Sujeet Sarkar, adding to this remarks 
that the influence of Bollywood in establishing people-to-people connection is greater  than 
any government efforts.
54
 However, state involvement in gaining support for  their foreign 
policy amongst the masses of the other country forms the basic principal of public diplomacy. 
In this context, the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), signed in 2011 between India and 
Afghanistan, is the benchmark of India’s foreign policy in Afghanistan. As the first formal 
agreement signed by Afghanistan and the first Strategic Agreement signed between India and 
any other South Asian country, the Strategic Partnership Agreement is symbolic of Nye’s 
concept of co-optive power manifested through ‘cultural and ideological attraction and its 
foreign policy framed in accordance to institutions of international regimes.’55 
While the Agreement, inter alia, highlights security cooperation and India’s assistance in 
“capacity building programmes for the Afghan National Security Forces,”56 it does not 
mention Indian deployment of troops on the Afghan front. Rather, greater emphasis is given 
to soft power resources through cultural cooperation and economic development. The 
strategic partnership between the two countries, as former Indian PM Mammohan Singh 
remarked, “will create an institutional framework so that India can help in Afghan capacity 
building in the areas of education, economic development and cooperation, and people-to-
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people contacts”.57 Under the institutional framework of the SPA, the Indian Council for 
Cultural Relations has spearheaded capacity building in Afghanistan by providing over 7,000 
scholarships to Afghan students and professionals. By displaying its progressive political 
values by supporting education initiatives and its economic capacity by investing in such 
programmes, India’s cultural diplomacy has sought to create a positive perception amongst 
the Afghans by catering to their needs. The education system in Afghanistan is feeble due to 
inadequate infrastructure, security concerns and significant gender disparity.
58
 The 
strongpoint of cultural diplomacy lays in its ability to connect masses and not just the 
governments. It aims at appealing the sentiments of people and creating a feeling of 
acceptance and mutual benevolence. While it is difficult to quantify a country’s soft power 
efforts, their outcomes can be assessed best through opinion polls, as they can give insight to 
the effect a nation’s public diplomacy has. Public response to India’s diplomatic efforts are 
evident both directly and indirectly. Dr. Masooda Jalal, a prominent Afghan activist 
appreciated India’s role in establishing female vocational training and skill building centres in 
Herat, Kabul and Kandahar, and hopes that a strengthened relationship between the two 
countries would improve the limited female emancipation programme.
59
 This has perhaps 
increased support for female empowerment within the country as 74% of Afghans think 
women should work outside the home, which would also contribute to the nation’s economic 
growth.
60
 
To further people-to-people interaction, New Delhi adopted a more liberal visa policy 
towards Afghan nationals in 2014. Greater movement of people would facilitate 
dissemination of liberal and progressive ideas of culture and democracy, which would give 
India a greater outreach and capacity to engage the civic societies on both sides, who are 
otherwise not involved in traditional diplomatic activities.
61
 Public diplomacy, in this sense, 
does not confine itself to limited measures but is advanced with more conviction when 
official government level diplomats envision and channel the transmission of ideas and 
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values they wish to project. The cultural dimensions of the Strategic Partnership have wielded 
successful results in rekindling stronger Indo-Afghan relations and have enabled India to 
further its political aspirations of establishing a stable democratic Afghanistan that would 
inherently distance itself from fundamentalist Pakistan. The construction of the Afghan 
Parliament by Indian authorities is the most evident physical manifestation of the Indian 
aspirations of promoting liberalism and democracy.   
In this context, India’s economic assistance is also believed to generate a healthy workforce 
and political capital which would favour democratic governance over Islamic 
fundamentalism. India’s developmental aid also considers its economic interest as 
Afghanistan serves as a rich resource base and also bridge between India and Central Asia. 
Afghanistan possesses rich reserves of copper, iron, gold and lithium, having great potential 
to boost Afghan economy. However, in the absence of any “reliable transit route to export 
minerals, and develop its mineral resource base” due to the threat of Taliban controlling 
mining activities, Kabul has welcome international investments in the energy and agricultural 
sector. India has addressed the needs of the local population by taking up various 
infrastructural projects. Commenced in 1976, the Salma dam was finally inaugurated in 2014 
and renamed as the Afghanistan-India Friendship Dam by Kabul. The hydro project had been 
targeted to several terrorist attacks aimed at “derailing the process of development and 
reconstruction in Afghanistan”, but the majority of Tajik speaking Herat province supported 
the project and celebrated its completion, thus favouring India’s soft power potential.62 As a 
means of gaining access to Central Asia, heads of India, Iran and Afghanistan signed the 
trilateral transit agreement in May 2016. India extended financial aid to the development of 
Chahbahar port on the Iranian coast, which will link India with Afghanistan and other central 
Asian countries. Islamabad, due to its apprehensions of increasing Indo-Afghan relations, had 
denied this connectivity overland. However, the trilateral agreement has only isolated 
Pakistan as a regional player in Central and West Asia. As per the Strategic Agreement, 
economic cooperation between the two countries is executed keeping in mind the long term 
and sustainable benefits to both the parties, and Pakistani interests are detrimental in 
achieving this goal. 
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New Delhi also advanced unflinching support to Afghanistan’s membership in the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which would enable the free flow of 
goods across borders in the region through the mechanism of South Asian Free Trade 
Agreement (SAFTA).
63
 Afghanistan’s membership in SAARC would contribute in 
developing a liberal and free market oriented economy, and thereby lead  to a politically 
stable and secure Afghanistan. The declaration of Bamiyan to be the cultural capital of 
SAARC for 2015-16 sought to revive the rich but desecrated Buddhist site and promote 
tourism contributing to economic growth and employment opportunities in the region. 
Afghanistan’s acknowledgement of India’s fight against Pakistani supported terrorism was 
reflected in the aftermath of the Uri attacks. Afghanistan not only followed India’s footsteps 
of boycotting the 2016 SAARC Summit to be held in Islamabad, but was the first nation to 
advocate in favour of diplomatically isolating Pakistan in the regional sphere. This marked 
the evident success of India’s soft power in the regional sphere since the election of PM 
Narendra Modi.  
It may come as little surprise that Pakistan has expressed apprehensions over the growing 
Indo-Afghan relations due to the fear of losing its political influence in the region. Pakistan 
has been highly sceptical of Afghanistan’s dependence on India and has to come expend the 
vaguely defined “benign economic and cultural relations”64 with Afghanistan. Furthermore, it 
has always followed a zero sum policy, eliminating any chances of peaceful trilateral 
cooperation. Pakistan’s false accusation of India and Afghanistan encouraging rebellion in 
Balochistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) as aimed at destabilizing 
political sanctity of Islamabad has reinstated Pakistan’s fears.  
On the other hand, while India’s policy in Afghanistan is not aimed explicitly at rooting out 
Pakistan’s presence, New Delhi realizes the risk that a strong Afghanistan-Pakistan 
relationship could   have grave consequences in regards to its strategic interests. The Pashtun 
community, which resides mainly on the Pakistan side of the Afghan border still experience a 
strong presence of Taliban and political assertion from Pakistan. As India seeks to establish 
stronger ties with the Pashtuns, Pakistan’s use of Islamic fundamentalism serves as a major 
roadblock in plans of consolidation. Keeping in mind its national interest, Kabul believed 
Pakistan would bring the Taliban to the negotiating tables as it had promised. India and 
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Afghanistan could only wait in futility, following which Afghanistan was put under 
diplomatic pressure from the Indian side. As a result, India maintained a low profile in the 
2014 Heart of Asia Conference and halted the investment in Chabahar port in Iran. Further, 
New Delhi has refused to consider Afghanistan’s request to “revive the Strategic Partnership 
Agreement or to hold a meeting of the Strategic Partnership Council.”.65  
India’s soft power in Afghanistan has however been spearheaded with the change of 
governments in both India and Afghanistan since 2014. Indian PM Narendra Modi has sought 
to advance a highly ambitious foreign policy towards Afghanistan wherein “India neither sees 
Afghanistan as a battleground for competing national interest nor assistance to Afghan 
reconstruction and development as a zero sum game”.66 Pakistan on the other hand has 
adopted a zero-sum attitude but wishes to attain a “strategic-depth” in Afghanistan by 
eliminating India’s security and strategic motives.67 With the withdrawal of US-NATO 
security forces, India has been compelled to ensure its security interest in Afghanistan i.e. 
primarily aimed at curtailing the Pakistan-Taliban alliance from muddling in India’s soft 
power initiatives. 
A major step taken in this direction was the Heart of Asia Conference hosted by India aimed 
at developing security, political and economic stability in Afghanistan and its neighbourhood. 
“We want dignified relations with our neighbors, not charity,”68 the Afghan President 
remarked in the 2016 Heart of Asia Conference- Islamabad Process, hosted by India. The 
aforementioned statement came from the Afghan President as he rejected Pakistan’s financial 
aid and condemned Islamabad for supporting extremist groups against the desire for 
cooperation and peace furthered by Kabul and New Delhi. For the first time, India and 
Afghanistan brought security concerns on to the table, while seeking to enhance 
developmental cooperation in tandem parallel. The understanding behind this is perhaps that 
India’s strategic interest of ensuring a politically stable Afghanistan can be achieved only 
when the hard power and soft power combines.  
Envisioning a stable Afghanistan: Outcomes of India’s Soft Power 
                                                          
65
 Ahmad Bilal Khalil, “The Tangled History of Afghanistan-India-Pakistan Triangle,” The Diplomat 
(December 16, 2016) URL: http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/the-tangled-history-of-the-afghanistan-india-
pakistan-triangle/  
66
 Pattanaik, “India’s Afghan Policy,” 579 
67
 Khalil, “The Tangled History”  
 
Student No. s1776118 
 
27 
 
India, Pakistan and Afghanistan have refuted the idea of entering into formal diplomatic 
engagements mutually beneficial to all three countries. However, their foreign policies are 
deeply intertwined. India’s policy in Afghanistan, as evident from the discussion, largely 
hinges on the security threat from Pakistan and Pakistan’s Afghan policy has been India 
centric, aiming to reduce the influence of the latter. Afghanistan on the other hand realizes 
this tug-of-war between India and Pakistan and has used its strategic location to build up the 
stakes for both the countries. 
69
 As India and Afghanistan embark persuasively on bilateral 
terms, they seek to achieve cooperation in various socio-economic and cultural areas 
including sports, health care and infrastructural development. 
 The Strategic Partnership Agreement in this regard has successfully displayed India’s 
willingness and capacity to employ its soft power on the one hand and Afghanistan’s 
acknowledgment of such a policy to be crucial for its national development on the other. The 
underlying strategic interest of India has been well covered as well. Since India does not wish 
to deploy military troops in Afghanistan, but by training Afghan recruits, India can shape 
their attitudes in its favour. This would inherently ensure India’s security interests are 
maintained in Afghanistan especially against Pakistan’s influence. The Agreement has thus 
facilitated India to achieve its soft power goals to a considerable extent by building the image 
of a much favoured nation against Pakistan, with nearly 70% of Afghan population have 
shown support to New Delhi’s diplomatic efforts.70 While New Delhi’s policy towards 
Pakistan has been severed in the light of recent events and distrust, Indo-Afghan relations on 
the contrary are hinged on mutual trust and goodwill Indian initiatives have been reciprocated 
by Kabul cordially.  
A major step taken in this direction was the Heart of Asia Conference hosted by India aimed 
at developing security, political and economic stability in Afghanistan and its neighbourhood. 
“We want dignified relations with our neighbors, not charity”,71 the Afghan President 
remarked in the 2016 Heart of Asia Conference- Islamabad Process, hosted by India. The 
aforementioned statement came from the Afghan President as he rejected Pakistan’s financial 
aid and condemned Islamabad for supporting extremist groups against the desire for 
                                                          
69
 Pattanaik, “India’s Afghan Policy” 573 
70
  “Majority of Afghans wants India, not Pakistan, to help,” The Economic Times, (January 21, 2010), URL: 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-01-21/news/28479206_1_opinion-poll-taliban-
administration-german-tv-ard .  
 
Student No. s1776118 
 
28 
 
cooperation and peace furthered by Kabul and New Delhi. For the first time, India and 
Afghanistan brought security concerns on to the table, while seeking to enhance 
developmental cooperation in tandem parallel. The understanding behind this is perhaps that 
India’s strategic interest of ensuring a politically stable Afghanistan can be achieved only 
when the hard power and soft power combines.  
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Conclusion 
The power dynamics between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan have been shaped by their 
strategic interests and inherently involve a trilateral dimension. Power, as a concept and in its 
utility has been subjected to individual interpretation.  This thesis develops India’s foreign 
relations on the understanding that soft power not just averts threats to national security, but 
also means of building long-term and stable relations in the region.  
The realization that soft power, may not suffice in achieving strategic interests especially 
pertaining to national security, compels nations to rely on coercive measures or “hard 
power”. The practice of “hard power,” then becomes a requisite in achieving immediate and 
short-term goals. New Delhi’s immediate response to Uri attacks were surgical strikes in 
Kashmir, and the Indus Treaty option was only resorted to later. However, hard power has its 
downsides as demonstrated by security concerns of India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
Summarizing this intricate power dynamics, Stephen Cohen remarked, “India has been doing 
a great job in helping in civil economic reconstruction and training of security forces of 
Afghanistan,” however, “by training security forces, India is in competition with Pakistan 
which is supporting the Taliban”.72 The Modi government realizes risks involved in relying 
heavily on military sources and therefore has made concerted efforts in striking a balance. 
This is evident from two factors- first, India has maintained its position as the largest 
importer of arms and have provided military assistance to Afghanistan as well, thus reflecting 
on India’s military preparedness. Secondly, the distinction between traditional and non-
traditional security has become distorted. The purpose of Leviathan, as articulated by Thomas 
Hobbes, is to protect the safety of its people, thus connecting state security and human 
security.
73
 India’s diplomatic stance towards Pakistan has revived the realist tradition but by 
resorting to diplomatic measures and not coercion. Soft power, in this regard as manifested 
through peaceful mechanisms of dialogue and negotiations, considers the significance of 
force but seeks to mitigate the risk associated with its application. 
The theory of soft power rests on gradual but long-lasting outcomes. India’s soft power aims 
at projecting its belief in universal values of peaceful coexistence and strong democratic 
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credentials and aspirations to achieve socio-economic prosperity. As Afghanistan seeks to 
rebuild itself, the Indian example, owing to its political stability, in comparison to an instable 
and authoritarian Pakistan, has proven to be more attractive and promising option. In this 
context, Indian PM remarked, “a unified, sovereign, democratic, peaceful, stable and 
prosperous Afghanistan,”74 would ensure mitigation of deeply entrenched terrorism and 
regional stability.  
Drawing on the above discussion, this thesis concludes that India has successfully asserted its 
strategic interest through a soft power approach and gained international acknowledgement as 
well. However, for fulfilling its strategic interest, India needs to strike a balanced approach 
between hard power and soft power .This balance, has been termed by Nye as “smart power” 
which aims at the nation’s security concerns and addresses them with a long-term solution.75 
Furthermore, effective hard power can ensure the practice and cultivation of soft power 
resources. In this regard, it becomes evident that hard power has shaped the undercurrent of 
India’s soft power policy, but in the long run, it is an effective and mature soft power which 
shields the national interest by mitigating the possibilities of coercion and favouring for 
peaceful coexistence and regional solidarity.  
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